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 Research literature on foreign assistance suggests that the U.S. provides aid in 
order to serve both its own strategic interests as well as the development needs of aid 
recipient countries. Maintaining a focus on Africa, this report uses newly available data 
for official development assistance and attempts to verify whether prevailing hypotheses 
regarding the motivations behind U.S. aid giving still hold true. Specifically, the report 
analyzes whether aid giving patterns align with 1) the development needs of recipient 
countries as understood through the lens of internationally established priorities, or 2) 
with good political and economic policies within recipient countries vis-à-vis democratic 
institutions and open markets, or 3) with U.S. national strategic interests (be they 
political, military, or economic interests).  
A statistical analysis of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 53 
countries in Africa over the period of 1970 to 2010 was carried out for this purpose. The 
results suggest that, when it comes to aid that is specifically addressed towards 
development projects in Africa, the strategic considerations and political priorities of the 
U.S. are just as important, if not more important, than the development needs or 
 vii 
 
economic performance of recipient countries. Political allies and countries that 
democratize receive more aid from the U.S., ceteris paribus. In addition, it was found that 
more aid is given to countries with larger populations -- a result that contradicts earlier 
literature on aid’s motivations. 
The report is organized as follows. I begin in Section 1 by providing a general 
overview of U.S. foreign aid. In Section 2, I detail why Africa is a significant continent 
for such an analysis of U.S. aid, and outline some of the trends in aid to Africa. The third 
section summarizes some of the most important existing hypotheses about why the U.S. 
gives development aid. Section 4 describes the data and methodology used for this study 
and provides a discussion of the results obtained from the statistical analysis. Finally, in 
Section 6, I conclude by offering broader policy implications and sketching out avenues 
for future research. 
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Section I: Why Does the U.S. Give Aid and to Whom? 
A. OVERVIEW OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID 
The United States is currently the world’s largest development aid donor. 
According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), gross disbursements of U.S. Bilateral 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) totaled 32 billion (constant USD) in 2011. This 
figure represents 0.2 percent of United States’ Gross National Income (GNI) and 21.5 
percent of the total bilateral ODA disbursements in that year by all DAC countries. 
Figure 1 shows U.S. ODA compared to that of other donor countries in 2011. Japan, 
Germany, France, and the U.K. have the highest volume of aid flows respectively after 
the U.S.  
Even though the U.S. is the largest donor in terms of the dollar amount provided, 
as a percentage of its GNI, the U.S. presently falls behind many other donor countries in 
the realization of its global commitment to the 0.7 percent target. In a 1970 United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution, governments of developed countries pledged to 
commit 0.7 percent of their GNI to development assistance. This commitment was 
reaffirmed at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico. Development experts contended that the fulfillment of this 
commitment was crucial to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 
the targeted deadline of 2015. 
Figure 2 shows the ODA disbursements of donor countries as a percentage of 
their GNI in 2011. Iceland, Australia, and Sweden lead the forefront with 2.09, 1.19, and 
1.09 percent of their GNI committed to ODA. United States is third to last in this list, 
preceding only Greece and Korea in its aid disbursement as a percent of GNI.  
 2  
 
 
Figure 1:  ODA Disbursements in 2011 by DAC Countries1 
 
Figure 2:  Disbursements as Percentage of DAC Country’s GNI in 20112 
                                                
1 Figures taken from OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/) 













































































































 3  
 
Despite the fact that U.S. development aid falls short of the 0.7 percent target, the 
disbursements have steadily increased over the years -- from a little over 15 billion USD 
in 1960 to over 30 billion USD in 2010 (in constant 2011 prices). Figure 3 shows ODA 
disbursements over this period. Aid amounts decreased in the period between 1995 and 
2000, but increased after the 9/11 attacks once again in 2001. Similarly, 2008 saw a sharp 
decrease in aid amounts most likely due to the financial crisis. However, development aid 
amounts increased again after that period.  
 
 
Figure 3: U.S. Bilateral ODA Disbursements3 
 
B. WHY DOES THE U.S. PROVIDE AID 
The United State’s rationale for providing foreign aid has traditionally been 
driven by three motivations:4 
                                                
3 Figures taken from OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/) 
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• Humanitarian assistance - As a response to natural disasters and human 
calamities, aid aimed at relieving human suffering. 
• Expansion of markets - In order to boost trade and domestic economic 
growth by developing U.S. export markets abroad and creating a suitable 
commercial environment for U.S. companies to compete in. 
• Preservation of national security - Since the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 especially, policy makers have increasingly viewed development 
aid as a valuable tool in the global ‘war on terrorism’, through 
strengthening ties with allies as well as helping them build their 
economies and democratic institutions.   
The U.S. Government also regards foreign aid as an instrumental foreign 
diplomacy tool (carrot vs. the stick). Its use has been evident in strategic U.S. 
partnerships around the world, especially in dealings with non-friendly governments. 
Further, aid is viewed as a manifestation of U.S. global leadership both in bilateral 
forums as well as multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and United Nations. 
 
C. WHERE IS THIS AID GOING 
In addition to the changing trends in volume, the composition of United States’ 
foreign aid has changed over the years as well reflecting a landscape of shifting priorities. 
The U.S. provided ODA to a total of 149 countries in 20105. Table 1 gives a breakdown 
of the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in 2000 and 2010. The list reflects a 
mixture of long standing development aid commitments with and the political-military 
strategic significance to the U.S. of these countries, in varying proportions. For instance, 
                                                
5 Tarnoff and Lawson 2011 
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the large share of foreign aid provided to Afghanistan and Iraq reflects U.S. engagements 
in both countries vis-à-vis the ongoing military conflict. Aid to countries such as Pakistan 
and Egypt is viewed through the lens of the strategic significance of these regions to U.S. 
interests - in the case of Pakistan, its proximity to Afghanistan and its relevance in the 
War on Terror; and in the case of Egypt, its ties with the Arab World and its ability to 
mediate in the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
 
2000 Foreign Assistance  
(in current USD millions) 
2010 Foreign Assistance  
(in current USD millions) 
Israel 4,069 Afghanistan 4,102 
Egypt 2,053 Israel 2,220 
Colombia 899 Pakistan 1,807 
West Bank/Gaza 485 Egypt 1,296 
Jordan 429 Haiti 1,271 
Russia 195 Iraq 1,117 
Bolivia 194 Jordan 693 
Ukraine 183 Kenya 688 
Kosovo 165 Nigeria 614 
Peru 120 South Africa 578 
Georgia 112 Ethiopia 533 
Armenia 104 Colombia 507 
Table 1: Top Recipients of U.S. Foreign Assistance6 
                                                
6 Tarnoff and Lawson 2011 
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U.S. foreign aid is distributed for a variety of development assistance purposes. 
Figure 4 shows the sectors for which the FY2012 Department of State and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) foreign aid disbursements were made. Even 
though the chart only depicts data for two of the total 16 aid agencies within the U.S., this 
is a helpful snapshot of some of the main funding priorities of U.S. aid in terms of the 
categories it is addressed towards. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sectoral Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid in 20127 
With close to seven billion USD requested in funds, the health sector receives the 
most attention by the State Department and MCC. U.S. foreign aid in this category goes 
towards programs to combat diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, pandemic 
influenza and other emerging public health threats, as well as towards maternal and child 
health, family planning and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, and 
nutrition. Economic development and environmental assistance follow with close to 4 
billion USD each. 
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D. HOW IS THIS AID DISTRIBUTED 
In terms of aid channels, currently most U.S. foreign aid is disbursed bilaterally, 
i.e. from government to government. In recent years this trend has largely been driven by 
the creation and subsequent disbursements of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and 
the Global AIDS Initiative in 2004 under the administration of former President George 
W. Bush. In FY2010, bilateral aid accounted for USD 12.3 billion or 32 percent of total 
foreign assistance appropriations for that year.8 In contrast, only USD 2.6 billion or 7 
percent was appropriated for multilateral aid contributions to international institutions. 
There are 16 U.S. government agencies that fund bilateral foreign aid activities. 
The principal five of these agencies providing bilateral economic assistance are:9 
• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
• State Department 
• U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
• Department of Defense (DoD) 
• Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
Combined, these five agencies account for about 88 percent of total development 
assistance obligations. USAID and the State Department have the largest contribution in 
foreign aid obligations with 35 percent each. 
U.S. multilateral foreign aid is disbursed through channels such as the various 
United Nations Funds and Programs as well as through development banks such as the 
World Bank. On average, U.S. contributions represent 20 percent of total donor transfers 
to multilateral development banks.10 
 
                                                
8 Figures taken from OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/) 
9 USAID Foreign Assistance Database (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/) 
10 Tarnoff and Lawson 2011 
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Section II: Overview of U.S. Aid to Africa 
Africa is the second largest and second most populous continent in the world. 
(See Appendix 1 for a map of Africa) Given its abundant natural and human resources, 
when several African countries entered into a period of de-colonization and began to 
engage in the process of democratization, many people thought that the continent’s time 
had come.  
Unfortunately, over the last few decades, Africa has come to represent a 
significant development challenge for global policy makers. Illiteracy, low mortality rates 
and poor economic progress continue to persist in several parts of the region despite the 
large amount of aid money that has been funneled into it over the years. For instance, in 
1970 the total ODA provided to Africa from all aid donors amounted to 1.68 billion 
(current prices USD). In 1990, the amount had increased to 26.18 billion and in 2010 to 
47.97 billion.11 
 Figure 5 shows the total bilateral aid to Africa (as an aggregate of 53 countries) 
from the U.S. from 1980 to 2010. As the figure illustrates, U.S. assistance to the 
continent has grown steadily over the years. In 1980, the amount committed was 3.9 
billion and in 2010 development aid equaled 8.28 billion (in constant 2009 USD). An 
interesting point to note is the 1991 spike in bilateral aid. The increase is attributed to the 
8.6 billion committed for Egypt in that year, which was driven by the importance of the 
country with regards to the Gulf War. 
 
                                                
11 Figures taken from OECD QWIDS (http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/) 
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Figure 5: Total U.S. Bilateral Development Aid to Africa 12 
 
The trend of increasing aid to Africa is also apparent in the sectors of education 
and health assistance. Figure 6 illustrates the increase in U.S. development aid disbursed 
for these purposes. 
 
 
Figure 6:  ODA Disbursed for Health and Education Purposes13  
                                                
12 Figures taken from AidData 2.0 (http://www.aiddata.org/content/index/data-search) 
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Although U.S. aid disbursements to Africa have increased over the years, the 
trend is not uniform across all the recipients -- some countries have historically received 
more aid than others. The following is a snapshot of U.S. development aid committed in 
2010. Countries were picked randomly to offer a sample. Aid amounts range from 0.09 
million for Kenya to 972.65 million USD for Ethiopia.  
 
Country ODA Committed 
(in constant 2009 USD millions) 
Algeria 13.43 
Benin 66.23 











Table 2: Bilateral ODA Committed to Sample African Countries in 201014 
                                                
14 Figures taken from AidData 2.0 (http://www.aiddata.org/content/index/data-search) 
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WHY IS AFRICA AN INTERESTING REGION FOR ANALYSIS 
African countries are certainly not the only ones struggling with development. But 
there are some distinctive features that make Africa a useful regional case for the 
purposes of this study, i.e. to analyze the motivations of U.S. aid. These factors are 
discussed below. 
Historically, Africa has been the largest recipient of aid. In 2010, Africa (overall 
as a continent) received 36 percent of the total development aid given globally. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the amount of aid provided by the U.S. has risen 
steadily over the years. In addition, U.S. is the largest aid donor to this continent. In 2008, 
the U.S provided 16 percent of the net ODA disbursed to Africa.15 Given the volume of 
aid over the last several years, Africa is a pertinent region to carry out a meaningful 
analysis of U.S. aid and its motivations. 
Further, Africa has been identified as the continent of highest need. Most Africans 
live on less than two dollars a day; average life expectancy in several countries is less 
than 50 years; many regions have faced severe droughts or famines at different times; and 
several countries are struggling to overcome conflict and successfully democratize. 
Although all African countries are not homogenous in terms of their development issues, 
there is a critical need for development across the continent. Thus, analyzing 
development aid given to a continent of such high development needs can provide useful 
insights. 
Finally, Africa also provides a good opportunity to re-test existing hypotheses 
regarding the motivations of U.S. aid giving (for instance development needs versus 
strategic interests). Some countries (such as Egypt) are of high strategic importance to the 
                                                
15 United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) and the NEPAD-OECD Africa 
Investment Initiative 2010 
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U.S. and the amount of aid they receive can be a reflection of this relationship. Others 
only represent a development challenge and can be useful in analyzing whether 
development aid correlates with development needs.  
In view of the factors mentioned above, Africa was chosen as the most suitable 
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Section III: Existing Hypotheses About U.S. Aid 
Research on U.S. development aid generally focuses on two main aspects of aid 
giving trends. The first has to do with the purposes or motivations of aid giving. The 
central question asked by researchers is ‘Why does the U.S. give aid?’. The second aspect 
of aid research considers the impact of U.S. development aid on recipient countries and 
asks ‘Is U.S. aid effective?’. This report will attend to the former question. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
R. D. McKinley and R. Little lay down much of the groundwork for subsequent 
literature on aid’s purposes by differentiating between recipient needs and donor interests 
in relation to aid giving patterns.16 Different researchers have found different results 
depending on the varying units of analysis employed, e.g. period of time included, 
particular donors considered, region focused on, and other explanatory variables. 
D. H. Lumsdaine proposed a constructivist view of aid and detailed how 
allocation patterns are driven by a) humanitarian concerns based on the recipient’s needs 
and b) moral ideals whereby powerful countries feel a moral obligation to help the weak -
- a combination of which he refers to as “pro-social behavior” -- as opposed to donor 
interests.17 In this conception, aid is perceived to align with the needs of recipient 
countries. 
P. J. Schraeder et al. found some correlation between aid allocations and poverty 
in recipient countries (defined here using GDP per capita measures).18 However, they 
found that when a more holistic view of poverty is considered, such as caloric intake or 
                                                
16 McKinley and Little 1979 
17 Lumsdaine 1993 
18 Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998 
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life expectancy, aid patterns are misaligned with recipient needs. Moreover, in their study 
of aid to Africa in the 1980s, they found evidence that strategic alliances, trade relations, 
and whether or not the recipient had a capitalist regime were stronger motivating factors 
for aid allocations. 
Several other researchers have also found that the strategic interests of donors 
play a significant role in aid giving. For instance, A. Maizels and M. K. Nissanke 
analyzed how U.S. aid shifted towards a national strategic interest leaning during the 
1980s.19 A. Alesina and D. Dollar provided a comparative study of donor behavior and 
concluded that more U.S. aid is given to former colonies (of other donors) and countries 
that share the political stances of the U.S. within the UN.20 E. Neumayer confirmed this 
strategic interest motive and detailed how this is not just limited to political 
considerations but also includes economic interests.21 His study found that aid is 
motivated by the geographic proximity of recipient countries and their share in U.S. 
export markets. 
G. Palmer et al. expanded the meaning of donor strategic interest and posited that 
aid is provided within the larger context of a donor’s foreign policy portfolio.22 Their 
study suggests that aid is directed towards encouraging recipient countries to behave in 
ways that are favorable to the donor. D. B. Carter and R. W. Stone also found evidence 
that supported this thesis and concluded that donors often use aid to “buy influence” with 
recipient governments.23 
                                                
19 Maizels and Nissanke 1984 
20 Alesina and Dollar 2000 
21 Neumayer 2003 
22 Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 2002 
23 Carter 2010 
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S. B. Bermeo extended the understanding of how strategic interests motivate aid 
giving.24 Her studies showed that development aid has shifted from its traditional 
strategic motivations to a more strategic development overall. She concludes that donors 
give more aid to countries that are geographically closer to them, that have historic or 
economic ties with them, and those that send immigrants to their country.25 Thus, aid 
giving is motivated by an interest to promote development in recipient countries where 
the returns from said development would be greatest to the donor itself. 
In the past few years, a third dimension has also been introduced to the study of 
aid’s motivations. This has been termed as the effect of good governance, and the 
question asked by researchers is whether donors provide more aid to countries that 
exhibit good governance vis-à-vis democratic institutions and/or open markets versus 
countries that have demonstrably bad institutions.  
D. L. Cingranelli and T. E. Pasquarello found evidence of human rights 
considerations in U.S. economic aid to Latin America -- higher levels of aid were given 
to countries that performed better on the human rights front.26 Similarly, S. C. Poe 
analyzed aid data from the Reagan and Carter Administrations for countries in the 
western hemisphere and found that human rights considerations were important in 
determining the trends in U.S. bilateral assistance.27 28 B. Abrams and K. Lewis found the 
same in their study on human rights and the motivations of U.S. foreign aid.29 
D. Carleton and M. Stohl refuted these conclusions and found that the status of 
human rights in the recipient country does not actually influence the motivations of aid 
                                                
24 Bermeo 2008 
25 Bermeo 2010 
26 Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985 
27 Poe 1992 
28 Poe, et al. 1994 
29 Abrams and Lewis 1993 
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giving. 30 Nor do some of the other factors of good governance. For instance, D. Dollar 
and V. Levin found that bilateral aid is not significantly related to the quality of 
governance.31 J. Svensson found no evidence of countries with less corruption being 
rewarded with higher aid.32 In fact, A. Alesina and B. Weder found evidence that, 
according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt states receive more aid.33 
In conclusion, research literature on U.S. foreign aid and its motivations can best 
be summarized by what Lancaster calls the “enduring dualism” of U.S. aid -- diplomacy 
and development.34 U.S. bilateral development aid contains elements of both political and 










                                                
30 Carleton and Stohl 1987 
31 Dollar and Levin 2006 
32 Svensson 1999 
33 Alesina and Weder 2002 
34 Lancaster 2007 
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Section IV: Statistical Modeling of U.S. Aid Allocations 
A. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The intent of this report is to analyze the motivations of U.S. aid to Africa. 
Although the stated motivations for foreign aid often voice a humanitarian imperative, it 
is worth remembering that foreign aid exists within a significant political realm. As the 
literature review above summarizes, U.S. aid is often not only motivated by the 
development needs of recipient countries but also by its own strategic interests or 
political priorities.  
Maintaining a focus on Africa, this report attempts to verify whether prevailing 
hypotheses regarding the motivations behind U.S. aid giving still hold true. Specifically, 
the report analyzes whether aid giving patterns align with 1) the development needs of 
recipient countries as understood through the lens of internationally established priorities, 
or 2) with good political and economic policies within recipient countries vis-à-vis 
democratic institutions and open markets, or 3) with U.S. national strategic interests (be 
they political, military, or economic interests). 
 
B. DATA 
The study looks at U.S. Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) given 
to 53 countries in Africa from 1970 to 2010 (see Appendix 2 for list of countries included 
in analysis).  OECD’s Glossary of Statistical Terms defines ODA as: “Flows of official 
financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with 
a grant element of at least 25 percent. By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions 
of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries and to multilateral 
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institutions.” ODA must be distinguished from the term ‘foreign assistance’, which 
consists of both military and economic assistance in the U.S. For the purposes of this 
report, only official development assistance is considered as aid.  
ODA figures were taken from AidData 2.0 and reported in constant 2009 USD 
committed values. I constructed averages over five-year time periods beginning with 
1971-75 and ending with 2006-10. This is a useful technique as it incorporates any 
lagged time effects that may exist, for instance from ODA budgeted in the previous year 
and disbursed in the next.  
For the purposes of the study, I chose to include the following as independent 
variables (see Appendix 3 for a more detailed description of the data used and the 
sources): 
• GDP per capita (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars. Figures were 
taken from World Bank Data35 for all countries and all years, and then 
averages were constructed for the five-year time periods. 
• Total population size of all countries in all years. Figures were taken from 
World Bank Data and converted into averages of five-year periods. 
• Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) for all countries and in each 
year included in the study, averaged over the five-year time periods. 
Figures were taken from World Bank Data. 
• Life expectancy at birth reported in total years for all countries and years 
included in study. These figures were also taken from World Bank Data 
and averaged over the time periods. 
                                                
35 World Bank Data (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
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• Net inflow of foreign direct investment as percentage of country’s GDP. 
According to World Bank Data (from where these figures were taken), this 
consists of “net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in 
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments.”36 Averages of five-year time periods 
were constructed for every country. 
• Dummy variable for trade openness developed by J. Sachs and A. Warner 
and updated by R. Wacziarg and K. H. Welch (SWWW).37 38 A country 
was given a value of 0 and characterized as closed for the years it had any 
of the following:39 
- average tariff rates higher than 40 percent 
- non-tariff barriers covered on average more than 40 percent of 
imports 
- it had a socialist economic system 
- it had a state monopoly of major exports 
- its black market premium exceeded 20 percent 
The trade openness status of a country reported in the initial year of a time 
period was used for the entire five-year block. 
                                                
36 World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS) 
37 Sachs, et al. 1995 
38 Wacziarg and Welch 2008 
39 Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001 
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• Political rights in a country. An index produced by Freedom House40 
every year since 1972 in which all countries are given a score from 1 to 7; 
where 1 means most free and 7 means least free. Averages were 
constructed for all scores over the five-year time periods. 
• Civil liberties in a country. Also produced by Freedom House and on the 
same 1-7 scale as political rights. Correlates about 0.9 with the political 
rights variable. 
• Total number of major conventional weapons delivered to all countries in 
each specific year by the U.S. Figures were taken from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfer Database41 and 
averaged over the five-year time period. 
• Affinity index generated by Strezhnez and Voeten42 using United Nations 
General Assembly Voting Data. Values for the affinity index (s3un) 
include 3 categories: 1 = “yes” or approval for an issue, 2 = abstain, 3 = 
“no” or disapproval for an issue. The resulting index ranges from -1 to +1, 
where the former depicts least similarity in voting patterns and the latter 
most similarity in voting patterns within the General Assembly. Data was 
included for the U.S. and all countries in Africa over 1970 to 2010. Again, 
averages were calculated for the five-year time periods. 
                                                
40 Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world) 
41 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers) 
42 UN General Assembly Voting Data 
(http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten;jsessionid=9638f07d26a76cd8e6881c2be7ae) 
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• Value of annual exports provided to all countries in Africa by the U.S. in 
each year included in study, reported in millions of dollars. Data was taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau43 and averaged over five-year periods. 
• Value of annual imports from all countries in Africa to the U.S. in each 
year, reported in millions of dollars. These figures were also taken from 
the Census Bureau and averaged over the five-year blocks. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Some of the variables were transformed for purposes of statistical modeling. ODA 
averages were transformed into log values. The same was done for GDP per capita, total 
population, and the value of imports and exports. Additional variables were also 
generated. The log of GDP per capita and the log of total population were squared. This 
is because I wanted to include GDP per capita and total population both linearly and 
quadratically in the model in order to analyze their effect over an expanded magnitude. 
In trying to determine what type of statistical model to use and given that the 
study was using panel data, both a fixed effects and a random effects model was run for 
all iterations. The results from both kinds of models were put through the Hausman test. 
In the cases where the test generated a p-value of less than 0.05, a fixed effects model 
was favored. Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 use country and time fixed effects. Models 5, 7, and 
8 use country and time random effects. 
I tested the models for the presence of autocorrelation, heteroskedacity, 
misspecification, and multi-collinearty. After performing the xtserial regression 
command to detect autocorrelation, I corrected for it by incorporating time effects in the 
                                                
43 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Division 
(http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/) 
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model. The xttest3 revealed the presence of heteroskedacity. To reduce its effect, a robust 
regression was run in the case of each model. An inspection of the histograms and 
residual scatter plots of all variables showed no evidence of misspecification in the final 
models. Transforming some of the variables through the log function overcame any 
issues of misspecification that may have existed. There is some evidence of multi-
collinearty. The VIF test generated values of greater than 10 for the log GDP per capita-
squared and the log population-squared variables. These are thus dropped in successive 
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Section V: Results 
Several regressions were run and variables were added sequentially. The sections 
below provide the aggregate results from each model explaining the motivations of 
bilateral ODA to Africa by the U.S. over 1971-2010 (see Appendices 4 – 11 for exact 
regression outputs). 
 
A. WHAT ARE THE MOTIVATIONS OF AID TO AFRICA 
For this round of statistical modeling, only a country and time fixed effects 
method has been employed as it yielded more efficient results (see Table 3). All three of 
the iterations of the model are statistically significant with F-probabilities of 0.00. In the 
first round, all variables except for population are statistically significant. However, 
population-squared is significant at the 0.01 level. The size of the coefficient indicates 
that as the size of the population of a country in Africa increases, the amount of aid given 
rises as well and that, too, at an increasing rate. This contradicts some of the earlier 
literature on U.S. aid that shows that more aid is given to smaller countries. GDP per 
capita is significant both when entered linearly and quadratically, indicating that 
development aid increases with GDP per capita, but at a decreasing rate. Over time, as a 
country becomes wealthier, aid amounts become smaller. Life expectancy and aid work 
in opposite directions. As the former improves, development aid goes down. Infant 
mortality and development aid also move in opposite directions, which is not a positive 
trend given that development assistance should follow development needs of recipient 
countries. 
For the second iteration of the model, I included some additional variables that 
could explain levels of aid. These variables pertain to the economic and political 
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governance or policies of a recipient country. The R-square value goes down from 0.465 
to 0.429, thus reducing the explanatory power of the model. However, this is most likely 
because two of the significant variables from the first iteration have been dropped in this 
round – log GDP-squared and log population-squared. GDP per capita, life expectancy, 
and infant mortality are no longer significant in this model, indicating that development 
needs of recipient countries are not a motivation of bilateral aid. Population becomes 
significant in this iteration of the model, and it is positively correlated with aid -- more 
aid goes to more populous countries. Of the new variables, only the political rights 
variable is statistically significant. As a country’s score becomes worse on the political 
rights index, the amount of aid received goes down. There is no correlation with the 
economic governance of a recipient, indicating that countries are not rewarded for 
adopting more open economies or attracting more foreign investment. 
For the final iteration of this model, I added additional variables that served as 
proxies for strategic interests (similarity of voting in the UN General Assembly as a 
proxy for political alliances and number of conventional arms provided as a proxy for 
military interests). The inclusion improves the R-square value and brings it to 0.44. Thus, 
44 percent of the variability in U.S. bilateral development aid to Africa is being explained 
by the variables included in this model. Population and political rights remain statistically 
significant and the size of both their coefficients has increased. Life expectancy once 
again becomes significant in this model. But the size of its effect on aid motivations is 
very small. Of the new variables, the affinity of nations index is significant and shows 
that as an African country votes more similar to the U.S. in the United Nations General 
Assembly sessions, the amount of aid provided by the U.S. goes up. This result is 
indicative of the significance of political alliances in development aid giving. 
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  LN (Bilateral ODA) 
 
(FE1) (FE2) (FE3) 
Number of Observations 340 276 275 
LN (GDP per capita) 4.760*** -0.394 -0.341 
 
(1.19) (0.39) (0.39) 





LN (Population) -4.876 5.204* 5.493* 
 
(3.17) (2.27) (2.28) 





Life Expectancy -0.088** -0.066 -0.073* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Infant Mortality -0.015* -0.016 -0.019 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 























   
(0.00) 
UN GA Affinity 
  
2.763* 
   
(1.15) 
R2 0.465 0.429 0.444 
	  
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression: Dependent Variable: Log of aid (five year 
averages) 1971-2010 
 
Overall, the statistical analysis shows that when it comes to U.S. development aid, 
the factors that hold the most explanatory power are related to the political and strategic 
priorities of the U.S. -- a country’s score on the political rights index as it democratizes; 
the similarity of a country’s voting pattern with that of the U.S. within the UN General 
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Assembly. Aid also aligns with larger country populations, which is very interesting 
given previous research on this variable estimated that more aid goes to countries with a 
smaller population. The size effect of life expectancy is too small to be of policy interest. 
Moreover, it does not serve as a fully adequate proxy for the development status of a 
country. 
 
B. THE EGYPT EFFECT 
Egypt is a unique case within Africa in that it has had a special strategic 
relationship with the U.S. This has meant that, while it may be more developed than 
many other countries in Africa, it receives a significant chunk of foreign aid from the 
U.S.; especially since the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords. Thus, it could be 
insightful to drop Egypt from the model and analyze how the exclusion affects the 
results. Table 4 provides aggregate figures from the resulting output. 
All three iterations of the sequential model are repeated, only this time without 
Egypt. The resulting models are all statistically significant overall with p-values of 0.00. 
In the first iteration, the same variables are significant as before and the differences in the 
coefficients are not that large. More aid is given to middle income countries as opposed 
to low-income countries. Larger countries receive more aid. Higher life expectancy 
within a recipient is correlated with lower aid. However, low infant mortality rates do not 
motivate greater aid giving. 
In the second iteration, the same variables are significant as in the first iteration. 
The size effect of population increases and shows that greater aid is given to countries 
with larger population sizes. GDP per capita and life expectancy have a negative 
relationship with aid. This is a positive marker about aid motivations as it shows that less 
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aid is given to countries with a higher GDP per capita and life expectancy rate. Infant 
mortality has a negative relationship with aid as well, which is once again not good. The 
exclusion of Egypt has not changed our results in this regard. Of the new variables, 
political rights retains its statistical significance and the direction of its relationship with 
aid. More aid is given to democratizing countries. Interestingly, minus Egypt, the net 
inflow of FDI as a percentage of the recipient country’s GDP becomes significant. As 
this number rises, so does aid. This indicates that U.S. aid modestly correlates with open 
trade and investment policies within a recipient country in Africa. 
With the third iteration, the model now includes all the chosen explanatory 
variables regarding aid’s motivations. Compared to the previous regression output in 
which Egypt was included, the results are fairly similar. Population size, status of 
political rights, and similarity in UN General Assembly voting patterns are significant. 
The size of the coefficients for all three variables is smaller but not very different from 
the previous model. 
Taken together, the model that excludes data from Egypt does not provide very 
different results compared to the model that includes Egypt. This indicates a positive 
trend in that the total development aid given to Africa is not significantly driven by the 
amounts given to Egypt due to its strategic significance to the U.S. However, it still 
demonstrates that overall development aid patterns align with the political and strategic 
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  LN (Bilateral ODA) 
 
(FE4) (RE5) (FE6) 
Number of Observations 332 268 267 
LN (GDP per capita) 4.584*** -0.469** -0.315 
 
(1.16) (0.16) (0.42) 




  LN (Population) -6.06 0.814*** 5.244* 
 
(3.39) (0.08) (2.45) 




  Life Expectancy -0.086** -0.1*** -0.069 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Infant Mortality -0.017* -0.024*** -0.019 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 























   
(0.00) 
UN GA Affinity 
  
2.694* 






* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4: Fixed and Random Effects Regression Without Egypt: Dependent Variable: 
Log of aid (five year averages) 1971-2010 
 
C. ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
This report has used similarity in UN General Assembly voting patterns and 
transfers of conventional arms as proxies for a strategic relationship between the U.S. and 
countries in Africa. These variables only consider the political-military aspect of strategic 
significance. It may be useful to also consider bilateral trade ties. As the chapter 
reviewing existing literature on the motivations of U.S. development aid shows, aid is 
often driven by the viability of foreign markets and exchange of goods. The next 
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iterations of the model thus use import and export variables to analyze aid giving 
patterns. There are some limitations to this model. First, due to the non-availability of 
trade figures for all countries over all the years included in this study, only 1996-2010 
data is being used. Second, the variable for arms delivered has been dropped for this 
iteration since it had limited explanatory value in previous models. This result is 
somewhat surprising. But it may likely be because: a) the study only considers 
conventional arms trade, and b) uses the number of arms delivered in a particular year to 
a particular country by the U.S. instead of the dollar value of the trade. Additionally, it 
may be due to the fact that this report only considers arms provided by the U.S. Results 
may have been different had I included the total arms delivered by all suppliers world-
wide as a proxy for U.S. strategic interests in a country within the considerations of larger 
geo-strategic interests. 
Table 5 shows results from the regressions with and without Egypt using 1996-
2010 data. Both outputs are significant overall with p-values of 0.00. The results are 
fairly similar both with and without Egypt, again indicating that this one country is not 
significantly driving the aid patterns to Africa. In both iterations of the model, GDP per 
capita, life expectancy, and the value of exports is highly significant. For the first two, the 
relationship is negative. As incomes and life expectancy rise, the amount of aid given 
goes down. This shows that in the short-term at least, aid patterns are modestly motivated 
by the development needs of recipient countries. The third, value of exports, is positively 
correlated with aid. This shows that as the value of exports to a country rises, the amount 
of aid given also rises. The result is indicative of strategic economic priorities that 
motivate even development aid allocations. Previous studies have also found evidence of 
the significance of export markets as a motivation for the aid given by the U.S. 
Interestingly, when Egypt is taken out, open trade policies become significant. The 
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results are surprising and show that as a country becomes an open trade economy, the 
amount of bilateral development aid given by the U.S. goes down. This indicates that 
good economic policies are not a motivational factor for U.S. aid giving. 
 
  LN (Bilateral ODA) 
 
(RE7) (RE8) 
Period 1996-2010 1996-2010 
Number of Observations 118 115 
LN (GDP per capita) -1.194***  -1.168 *** 
 
(0.29) (0.25) 
LN (Population) 0.359* 0.345* 
 
(0.18) (0.17) 
Life Expectancy -0.184*** -0.191*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Infant Mortality -0.037 -0.036 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
FDI as % of GDP 0.009 0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Trade Openness -0.508 -0.506* 
 
(0.31) (0.22) 
Political Rights -0.071 -0.058 
 
(0.14) (0.12) 
Civil Liberties -0.03 -0.086 
 
(0.18) (0.16) 
UN GA Affinity 2.387 2.386 
 
(1.65) (1.68) 
LN (Imports) -0.078 -0.063 
 
(0.08) (0.08) 
LN (Exports) 0.907*** 0.828*** 
  (0.14) (0.16) 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
Table 5: Random Effects Regression With and Without Egypt: Dependent Variable: 
Log of aid (five year averages) 1996-2010 
 
This model provides an analysis of U.S. development aid over a shorter period of 
time. The results confirm the dualism in aid’s motivations -- aid is motivated both by 
humanitarian concerns and by national strategic interests. 
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Section VI: Looking Ahead 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Research on development aid not only gives prominence to the impact of 
development interventions, but also its purposes -- where the purposes “are frequently as 
much the result of what happens inside of a donor government’s borders as what happens 
outside them”.44 Building an empirical foundation upon which to answer the question 
‘What motivates aid giving patterns?’ can be a key step in understanding why aid is given 
and whether or not its goals are being met.  
According to researchers interested in aid effectiveness, a recurring problem with 
foreign aid (and one that necessitates reform) is that it does not respond to the 
development needs of recipient countries. To them, evidence suggests that U.S. 
assistance tends to be a reflection of its own national policy themes or political agenda. 
Policy makers on the other hand, may look at the limited effectiveness of development 
aid and question its need. This dichotomy between aid’s perceived motivations becomes 
especially stark during times of domestic crises. This was evident in the last few years 
when the U.S. experienced economic shocks. As the Congress pushed for budgetary 
constraint, development aid became an easy target for budget cuts. 
What is missing in the debate about aid is an acknowledgement that if 
development aid is being provided for motivations other than development, then aid’s 
impact or effectiveness cannot be measured by its development outcomes alone.  
This report presents findings from a study of the motivations of U.S. aid to 
countries in Africa in order to be able to understand the trends that have governed 
allocations and draw conclusions about the question of why aid is given. The report is a 
                                                
44 Lancaster 2007 
 32  
 
contribution towards the larger body of research pertaining to U.S. development aid that 
studies whether bilateral aid aligns with the development needs of recipient countries or 
whether it speaks more to considerations that are exogenous to the needs of the African 
countries themselves, i.e. the national strategic interest or political priorities of the U.S. 
The central policy thrust here is that development aid cannot be measured against desired 
development outcomes when it is being motivated by non-development related factors. 
 
B. SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Most of the literature on U.S. bilateral development aid has focused on the 
differentiation between recipient needs versus donor interests using varying 
interpretations. Over time, a third dimension was introduced that analyzed whether the 
quality of governance affected the motivations of aid giving in any way. This report 
considered all three elements and built a holistic model of U.S. aid patters to African 
countries over time, and found that when it comes to aid that is specifically addressed 
towards development projects in Africa, the strategic considerations and political 
priorities of the U.S. are just as important, if not more important, than the development 
needs or economic performance of recipient countries. For instance, political allies and 
countries that democratize receive more aid from the U.S., ceteris paribus. 
Future research could address added elements of donor behavior with regards to 
the motivations of aid giving. One key variable to consider is the impact of international 
norms surrounding development priorities and aid patterns. Institutions such as the World 
Bank and the UN often set the normative stage with regards to aid policy and trends in 
allocations. A future study could refine analysis of aid’s motivations by considering cases 
where the international community set a clear development agenda that subsequently 
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influenced aid allocations of all donors. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are 
a great example of this exercise in international norm setting. A statistical analysis of aid 
patterns for specific purposes could uncover whether there was a significant shift in aid 
giving pre- and post-MDGs. Should there be evidence of such aid patterns, this would be 
an added element to consider in the mix of motivations driving aid giving since it is 
driven by the international community’s understanding of aid policy and acts 
independently of recipient development needs and/or donor strategic interests.  
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN STUDY 
 
• Algeria • Angola • Benin 
• Botswana • Burkina Faso • Burundi 
• Cameroon • Cape Verde • Central African Republic 
• Chad • Comoros • Cote D'Ivoire 
• DRC • Djibouti • Egypt 
• Equatorial Guinea • Eritrea • Ethiopia 
• Gabon • Ghana • Guinea 
• Guinea-Bissau • Kenya • Lesotho 
• Liberia • Libya • Madagascar 
• Malawi • Mali • Mauritania 
• Mauritius • Morocco • Mozambique 
• Namibia • Niger • Nigeria 
• Republic of the Congo • Rwanda • São Tomé and Príncipe 
• Senegal • Seychelles • Sierra Leone 
• Somalia • South Africa • Sudan 
• Swaziland • Tanzania • The Gambia 
• Togo • Tunisia • Uganda 
• Zambia • Zimbabwe  
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APPENDIX 3 – DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
in constant 2005 
international dollars  
PPP GDP is gross domestic product 
converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. GDP at 
purchaser's prices is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. 
World Bank Data 
Population Size of total population World Bank Data 
Infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births) 
Estimates of levels and trends in child 
mortality 
World Bank Data 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the 
number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
the time of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life. 
World Bank Data 
Net inflow of foreign 
direct investment as 
percentage of 
country’s GDP 
Net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent 
or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that 
of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital 
as shown in the balance of payments. 
World Bank Data 
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Variable Description Source 
Trade openness A country is characterized as closed if it 
has any of the following: average tariff 
rates higher than 40 percent; non-tariff 
barriers covered on average more than 40 
percent of imports; it had a socialist 
economic system; it had a state 
monopoly of major exports; or its black 




and Welch, Karen 
Horn (SWWW) 
Political rights The state of democracy and political 
rights in a country scored on a scale from 
1 to 7, where 1 is the best and 7 worst. 
Freedom House 
(various years) 
Civil liberties The status of civil liberties in a country 
scored on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is 





Includes Aircraft; Air Defence Systems; 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapons; 
Armoured Vehicles; Artillery; Engines; 






Affinity of nations 
index  
Index ranges from -1 to +1, where the 
former depicts least similarity in voting 
patterns and the latter most similarity in 
voting patterns within United Nations 
General Assembly. 
Strezhnez, Anton 
and Voeten, Erik 
Exports in millions of 
dollars 
Value of annual exports of goods to 
countries. 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau 
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Variable Description Source 
Imports in millions of 
dollars 
Value of annual imports of goods from 
countries. 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau 
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APPENDIX 4 – ITERATION 1 REGRESSION RESULTS: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION WITH 




                                                                                 
            rho    .94615714   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.0951228
        sigma_u    4.5907156
                                                                                 
          _cons     14.74139   30.58632     0.48   0.632    -46.72412    76.20689
      _Itime2_8    -.5050963   1.358971    -0.37   0.712    -3.236051    2.225858
      _Itime2_7    -1.039161   1.254533    -0.83   0.412    -3.560239    1.481918
      _Itime2_6    -1.696811   1.019665    -1.66   0.102    -3.745905    .3522817
      _Itime2_5    -.6344927   .8114697    -0.78   0.438    -2.265202    .9962167
      _Itime2_4     .1745453    .665535     0.26   0.794    -1.162897    1.511988
      _Itime2_3     .7545521    .484574     1.56   0.126    -.2192357     1.72834
      _Itime2_2     .2269589   .3430264     0.66   0.511    -.4623784    .9162962
mortalityrate~i    -.0152168   .0069442    -2.19   0.033    -.0291717   -.0012618
lifeexpectanc~s    -.0880152   .0257863    -3.41   0.001    -.1398347   -.0361956
        logpop2     .2798498   .0919378     3.04   0.004     .0950939    .4646058
         logpop    -4.875742   3.171004    -1.54   0.131    -11.24811    1.496628
        loggdp2     -.353074   .0836956    -4.22   0.000    -.5212667   -.1848813
         loggdp     4.759613   1.185316     4.02   0.000     2.377632    7.141595
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 50 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9583                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,49)           =     29.08
       overall = 0.4565                                        max =         8
       between = 0.6332                                        avg =       6.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4646                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        50
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       340
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ortalityrateinfantper1000livebi i.time2, fe robust
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp loggdp2 logpop logpop2 lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears m
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APPENDIX 5 – ITERATION 2 REGRESSION RESULTS: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION WITH 




                                                                                 
            rho    .97245464   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.1607659
        sigma_u    6.8969191
                                                                                 
          _cons    -55.44422   32.93744    -1.68   0.100    -122.0133    11.12483
      _Itime2_8    -2.052111   2.266031    -0.91   0.371    -6.631931    2.527709
      _Itime2_7    -2.431791    2.04018    -1.19   0.240    -6.555149    1.691567
      _Itime2_6    -2.803331   1.675102    -1.67   0.102    -6.188838    .5821758
      _Itime2_5    -1.627702   1.311864    -1.24   0.222    -4.279077    1.023674
      _Itime2_4    -.7333698   1.081748    -0.68   0.502    -2.919664    1.452925
      _Itime2_3     .1036718   .7592206     0.14   0.892     -1.43077    1.638114
      _Itime2_2    -.1559407   .4667948    -0.33   0.740    -1.099368    .7874869
 civilliberties     .2388065   .2346938     1.02   0.315    -.2355274    .7131403
politicalrights    -.2915372   .1118873    -2.61   0.013    -.5176699   -.0654046
  tradeopenness    -.4256827   .4702574    -0.91   0.371    -1.376108     .524743
foreigndirect~w     .0242265   .0139846     1.73   0.091    -.0040375    .0524905
mortalityrate~i    -.0156116   .0113097    -1.38   0.175    -.0384693    .0072461
lifeexpectanc~s     -.065593   .0345375    -1.90   0.065     -.135396      .00421
         logpop     5.203586   2.270045     2.29   0.027      .615653    9.791518
         loggdp    -.3940436   .3853111    -1.02   0.313    -1.172786    .3846992
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9787                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(15,40)           =     25.28
       overall = 0.3868                                        max =         8
       between = 0.5830                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.4286                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        41
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       276
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ivilliberties i.time2, fe robust
> ntper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights c
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinfa
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APPENDIX 6 – ITERATION 3 REGRESSION RESULTS: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION WITH 





                                                                                 
            rho    .97606426   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.1526687
        sigma_u    7.3607197
                                                                                 
          _cons    -59.73444   33.23136    -1.80   0.080    -126.8975    7.428646
      _Itime2_8    -.5983694   2.299191    -0.26   0.796    -5.245207    4.048468
      _Itime2_7    -.9514164   2.068002    -0.46   0.648    -5.131005    3.228173
      _Itime2_6    -2.019163   1.664707    -1.21   0.232    -5.383662    1.345337
      _Itime2_5    -.7229269   1.333923    -0.54   0.591    -3.418886    1.973032
      _Itime2_4     .7160134   1.251651     0.57   0.570    -1.813667    3.245694
      _Itime2_3     1.466372   .9178621     1.60   0.118    -.3886967     3.32144
      _Itime2_2     .0222798    .479931     0.05   0.963     -.947697    .9922566
   ungaaffinity     2.763095   1.153242     2.40   0.021     .4323054    5.093884
  armsdelivered    -.0000556   .0000441    -1.26   0.215    -.0001448    .0000336
 civilliberties     .2516245   .2271309     1.11   0.275    -.2074242    .7106731
politicalrights    -.2942998   .1013262    -2.90   0.006    -.4990877   -.0895119
  tradeopenness    -.2702426   .4925743    -0.55   0.586    -1.265773    .7252872
foreigndirect~w     .0214808    .019784     1.09   0.284     -.018504    .0614657
mortalityrate~i    -.0187254   .0107694    -1.74   0.090    -.0404911    .0030403
lifeexpectanc~s    -.0733842   .0341419    -2.15   0.038    -.1423875    -.004381
         logpop      5.49286   2.276513     2.41   0.021     .8918563    10.09386
         loggdp    -.3406749   .3904054    -0.87   0.388    -1.129714    .4483639
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9808                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,40)           =     24.40
       overall = 0.3863                                        max =         8
       between = 0.5838                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.4436                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        41
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       275
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ivilliberties armsdelivered ungaaffinity i.time2, fe robust
> ntper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights c
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinfa
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APPENDIX 7 – ITERATION 4 REGRESSION RESULTS: NON-EGYPT FIXED EFFECTS 
REGRESSION WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOG OF AID (FIVE YEAR AVERAGES) 1971 
TO 2010 
 
                                                                                  
            rho    .93334688   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.0983023
        sigma_u    4.1099183
                                                                                 
          _cons     26.60599   33.85558     0.79   0.436    -41.46522    94.67719
      _Itime2_8    -.3459527   1.421662    -0.24   0.809    -3.204395     2.51249
      _Itime2_7    -.9068043   1.319846    -0.69   0.495    -3.560532    1.746924
      _Itime2_6    -1.600909   1.077961    -1.49   0.144    -3.768295    .5664763
      _Itime2_5    -.5605753   .8573495    -0.65   0.516    -2.284392    1.163241
      _Itime2_4     .2406667    .696765     0.35   0.731    -1.160273    1.641607
      _Itime2_3     .7872234   .5046673     1.56   0.125    -.2274781    1.801925
      _Itime2_2     .2041644   .3549009     0.58   0.568    -.5094118    .9177405
mortalityrate~i    -.0168923   .0076521    -2.21   0.032    -.0322778   -.0015067
lifeexpectanc~s    -.0855274   .0266691    -3.21   0.002    -.1391492   -.0319055
        logpop2     .3089065   .0925621     3.34   0.002     .1227979     .495015
         logpop    -6.059705   3.391465    -1.79   0.080     -12.8787    .7592935
        loggdp2    -.3385278   .0822555    -4.12   0.000    -.5039135   -.1731421
         loggdp     4.583513   1.156699     3.96   0.000     2.257813    6.909213
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9512                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(13,48)           =     31.16
       overall = 0.4261                                        max =         8
       between = 0.6109                                        avg =       6.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.4713                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        49
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       332
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ortalityrateinfantper1000livebi i.time2, fe robust
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp loggdp2 logpop logpop2 lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears m
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APPENDIX 8 – ITERATION 5 REGRESSION RESULTS: NON-EGYPT RANDOM EFFECTS 




                                                                                 
            rho    .08319877   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.1702462
        sigma_u    .35253164
                                                                                 
          _cons     14.77129   4.876387     3.03   0.002     5.213751    24.32884
      _Itime2_8     1.294207   .6032474     2.15   0.032     .1118633     2.47655
      _Itime2_7     .4050108   .6070438     0.67   0.505    -.7847732    1.594795
      _Itime2_6    -.4068848   .5252378    -0.77   0.439    -1.436332    .6225624
      _Itime2_5     .5002578   .3617591     1.38   0.167     -.208777    1.209293
      _Itime2_4     1.086351   .3779958     2.87   0.004     .3454928    1.827209
      _Itime2_3     1.390979   .2899078     4.80   0.000     .8227704    1.959188
      _Itime2_2     .5788374   .3355269     1.73   0.084    -.0787833    1.236458
 civilliberties     .1306192   .2117521     0.62   0.537    -.2844074    .5456457
politicalrights    -.3161992   .1052154    -3.01   0.003    -.5224177   -.1099808
  tradeopenness     -.169257   .3520082    -0.48   0.631    -.8591804    .5206663
foreigndirect~w     .0447735    .015377     2.91   0.004     .0146351    .0749118
mortalityrate~i    -.0236399   .0101613    -2.33   0.020    -.0435558   -.0037241
lifeexpectanc~s    -.0997852   .0341582    -2.92   0.003    -.1667339   -.0328364
         logpop     .8141087   .1537334     5.30   0.000     .5127967    1.115421
         loggdp    -.4690575   .2017289    -2.33   0.020    -.8644389   -.0736761
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =    514.02
       overall = 0.5494                                        max =         8
       between = 0.7198                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.3903                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        40
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       268
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ivilliberties i.time2, re robust
> ntper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights c
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinfa
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APPENDIX 9 – ITERATION 6 REGRESSION RESULTS: NON-EGYPT FIXED EFFECTS 
REGRESSION WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOG OF AID (FIVE YEAR AVERAGES) 1971 
TO 2010 
 
                                                                                  
            rho    .97288979   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    1.1630456
        sigma_u    6.9672618
                                                                                 
          _cons    -56.20037   35.12516    -1.60   0.118    -127.2477    14.84698
      _Itime2_8    -.4380954   2.408561    -0.18   0.857    -5.309869    4.433678
      _Itime2_7    -.8191244   2.176824    -0.38   0.709    -5.222166    3.583917
      _Itime2_6    -1.930833   1.757123    -1.10   0.279    -5.484949    1.623283
      _Itime2_5    -.6562493   1.401564    -0.47   0.642    -3.491179    2.178681
      _Itime2_4      .744891   1.282849     0.58   0.565    -1.849916    3.339699
      _Itime2_3      1.47269   .9333821     1.58   0.123    -.4152531    3.360634
      _Itime2_2     -.056148   .4854718    -0.12   0.909    -1.038107    .9258114
   ungaaffinity     2.693525   1.129471     2.38   0.022     .4089553    4.978095
  armsdelivered     .0000917   .0002103     0.44   0.665    -.0003337    .0005171
 civilliberties     .2476341   .2406928     1.03   0.310     -.239213    .7344813
politicalrights     -.275242   .1016513    -2.71   0.010    -.4808512   -.0696329
  tradeopenness     -.276214   .5012238    -0.55   0.585    -1.290035    .7376068
foreigndirect~w     .0219326   .0199538     1.10   0.278    -.0184278     .062293
mortalityrate~i    -.0190792   .0115197    -1.66   0.106    -.0423799    .0042215
lifeexpectanc~s    -.0689356   .0362695    -1.90   0.065    -.1422977    .0044264
         logpop     5.244005    2.44592     2.14   0.038      .296665    10.19134
         loggdp     -.315485   .4179149    -0.75   0.455    -1.160798    .5298277
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9805                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,39)           =     27.11
       overall = 0.3515                                        max =         8
       between = 0.5714                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.4469                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        40
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       267
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
> ivilliberties armsdelivered ungaaffinity i.time2, fe robust
> ntper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights c
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinfa
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APPENDIX 10 – ITERATION 7 REGRESSION RESULTS: WITH EGYPT RANDOM EFFECTS 
REGRESSION WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOG OF AID (FIVE YEAR AVERAGES) 1965 
TO 2010 
 
                                                                                  
            rho    .48650546   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .77988827
        sigma_u    .75911633
                                                                                 
          _cons      32.0166   5.103928     6.27   0.000     22.01309    42.02012
      _Itime2_8            0  (omitted)
      _Itime2_7    -.6055125   .2063709    -2.93   0.003    -1.009992   -.2010329
      _Itime2_6    -2.062499   .5559638    -3.71   0.000    -3.152168   -.9728298
     logexports     .9069207   .1710712     5.30   0.000     .5716272    1.242214
     logimports    -.0779897   .0757334    -1.03   0.303    -.2264245    .0704451
   ungaaffinity     2.387003   1.683037     1.42   0.156    -.9116877    5.685694
 civilliberties    -.0297757   .1674303    -0.18   0.859    -.3579332    .2983817
politicalrights    -.0706239   .1228928    -0.57   0.566    -.3114893    .1702415
  tradeopenness    -.5076156   .2191638    -2.32   0.021    -.9371688   -.0780625
foreigndirect~w     .0088421   .0150309     0.59   0.556    -.0206179     .038302
mortalityrate~i    -.0371465   .0106298    -3.49   0.000    -.0579806   -.0163124
lifeexpectanc~s    -.1836976   .0386272    -4.76   0.000    -.2594055   -.1079896
         logpop     .3594347   .1805963     1.99   0.047     .0054726    .7133969
         loggdp    -1.194458   .2693224    -4.44   0.000     -1.72232   -.6665957
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =    441.99
       overall = 0.8235                                        max =         3
       between = 0.8680                                        avg =       2.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.7084                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        41
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       118
note: _Itime2_8 omitted because of collinearity
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
>  civilliberties ungaaffinity logimports logexports i.time2, re robust
> antper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinf
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APPENDIX 11 – ITERATION 8 REGRESSION RESULTS: NON-EGYPT RANDOM EFFECTS 





                                                                                 
            rho     .4524414   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .75490323
        sigma_u    .68621017
                                                                                 
          _cons     32.78782   4.740217     6.92   0.000     23.49716    42.07847
      _Itime2_8            0  (omitted)
      _Itime2_7    -.6968394   .1933847    -3.60   0.000    -1.075866   -.3178124
      _Itime2_6    -2.215775   .5384879    -4.11   0.000    -3.271192   -1.160358
     logexports      .828264   .1578481     5.25   0.000     .5188874    1.137641
     logimports    -.0631273   .0771434    -0.82   0.413    -.2143255    .0880709
   ungaaffinity     2.385902   1.678239     1.42   0.155    -.9033856     5.67519
 civilliberties     -.086319   .1643202    -0.53   0.599    -.4083807    .2357427
politicalrights    -.0577264   .1212943    -0.48   0.634    -.2954588     .180006
  tradeopenness    -.5060847   .2214688    -2.29   0.022    -.9401556   -.0720138
foreigndirect~w     .0099892   .0155444     0.64   0.520    -.0204773    .0404557
mortalityrate~i    -.0355692   .0098242    -3.62   0.000    -.0548243   -.0163141
lifeexpectanc~s    -.1912948   .0368055    -5.20   0.000    -.2634322   -.1191573
         logpop     .3454806   .1716156     2.01   0.044     .0091203     .681841
         loggdp    -1.168181   .2511399    -4.65   0.000    -1.660406    -.675956
                                                                                 
         logoda        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                Robust
                                                                                 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 40 clusters in country2)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =    465.93
       overall = 0.8445                                        max =         3
       between = 0.8910                                        avg =       2.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.7245                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: country2                        Number of groups   =        40
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       115
note: _Itime2_8 omitted because of collinearity
i.time2           _Itime2_1-8         (naturally coded; _Itime2_1 omitted)
>  civilliberties ungaaffinity logimports logexports i.time2, re robust
> antper1000livebi foreigndirectinvestmentnetinflow tradeopenness politicalrights
. xi: xtreg logoda loggdp logpop lifeexpectancyatbirthtotalyears mortalityrateinf
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